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THE LOUISIANA CONCEPT OF RES JUDICATA
There are several reasons why a decided case should preclude
relitigation of what it decided. First, the parties at some point must
know with certainty their rights and obligations arising out of the
incident. Second, the decided case should prevent one party from
being able to harass another by raising the same controversy again.
In addition, the judicial system should not be burdened with hearing
previously decided cases or subjected to the possibility of inconsistent
decisions on the same matter.'
The determination of when to preclude a second suit is a difficult
problem, common to almost all legal systems.' Clearly if exactly the
same suit is again raised its litigation should not be allowed. But if
the case raised is not precisely the one previously litigated, it is diffi-
cult to determine when its litigation should not be allowed. A party
should not be denied access to the courts on a claim legitimately not
connected with that previously tried. However, he should not be al-
lowed to subvert the finality of a prior suit by bringing one nominally
different but essentially the same as the first. Similarly, a party
should not have to bring or defend multiple suits to establish his
rights or obligations arising out of a single incident.
In order to resolve this question, various concepts have devel-
oped. 3 The most common is that of res judicata, which precludes the
same parties from litigating the same cause of action (claim) raised
in a prior suit even if that cause of action was not fully litigated. Thus
a party must produce all the available evidence to prove his case and
demand any relief to which he would be entitled should his case be
proved. He is not allowed to relitigate simply by requesting a differ-
1. A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION 7-12 (1969) [hereinafter cited as VESTAL].
See also Olsen Engr. Corp. v. Hudson Engr. Corp., 289 So. 2d 346, 355 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1973) (concurring opinion).
2. VESTAL at 501.
3. These concepts include collateral estoppel, often referred to in Louisiana as
judicial estoppel, which precludes relitigation of any facts previously judicially deter-
mined even though the new suit involves a different cause of action. Although collat-
eral estoppel has been applied in Louisiana, see, e.g., California v. Price, 234 La. 338,
99 So. 2d 743 (1957), the concept has never been fully recognized and the Fourth
Circuit has recently refused to apply it. Bordelon v. Landry, 278 So. 2d 173 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1973). See also Olsen Engr. Corp. v. Hudson Engr. Corp., 289 So. 2d 346, 352
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1973): "We note initially that there is some dispute over whether
Louisiana embraces the doctrine of collateral or judicial estoppel."
Another preclusion device of more recent origin is the compulsory counterclaim.
Louisiana does not recognize this preclusion device. Still another preclusion device is
involved where a party has "split" his cause of action. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 425.
This article is discussed in the text at note 72 infra.
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ent type of relief or because he did not raise certain issues or evidence.
In both Anglo-American and Louisiana law the concept of res
judicata is functionally the same. There is, however, a different un-
derlying basis for the operation of the doctrine in the two systems.
At common law, the doctrine is based on a concept of extinguishment
of the cause of action. If a judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, the
cause of action is considered to merge in the judgment leaving only
the judgment. If a judgment is rendered for the defendant, the judg-
ment operates as a bar to relitigation of the cause of action which is
again considered extinguished. Since the cause of action is extin-
guished by the lawsuit, res judicata precludes litigation of not only
that which was pleaded but also any issue which might have been
pleaded with regard to that cause of action.' In this way res judicata
effects a true claim preclusion . 5
The Louisiana doctrine of res judicata is civilian in origin and is
based on a presumption of correctness rather than on an extinguish-
ment of the cause of action.' Article 2285 of the Civil Code enumer-
ates "[t]he authority which the law attributes to the thing ad-
judged" as a legal presumption and article 2287 declares that "[n]o
proof is admitted against the presumption of the law . . . ." The
basis of this presumption is that the lawsuit is an attempt to ascer-
tain the truth.7 Since the controversy must have a definitive end at
some point, the decided case is presumed to have found the truth and
be correctly decided.' In order to insure that only matters which have
been adjudicated are precluded, Civil Code article 2286 provides:
The authority of the thing adjudged takes place only with respect
to what was the object of the judgment. The thing demanded
must be the same; the demand must be founded on the same
cause of action; the demand must be between the same parties;
4. See generally M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 201-07 (1972); F. JAMES, CIVIL
PROCEDURE §§ 11.9-10 (1965).
5. This distinction between claim preclusion and issue preclusion has been devel-
oped by Professor Vestal. Res judicata and the compulsory counterclaim are forms of
claim preclusion in that they preclude the entire claim from relitigation, even those
portions not raised. Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, is a form of issue preclusion
in that it precludes only those issues already adjudicated and not the claim itself.
6. In Louisiana, res judicata is raised by way of the peremptory exception. LA.
CODE CIv. P. art. 927.
7. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, no. 54 A(2) (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl.
1959).
8. Id.; 1 M. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 581 (Evans transl.
1853).
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and formed by them against each other in the same quality.'
Therefore, the decided case precludes a second suit only if it involves
the same parties, the same cause, and the same object of demand as
the prior suit.
Despite the underlying differences with the Anglo-American con-
cept, Louisiana's res judicata law is also one of true claim preclu-
sion.1" Where the three requirements of identity are met, the claim is
precluded even if some matter not pleaded in the first suit is now
pleaded. Thus in Louisiana, as in the Anglo-American law, a party
should not be allowed a second suit simply because he did not pray
for all the relief to which he was entitled on the cause asserted" or
because he failed to offer all the evidence available to prove his
claim.2 It is incorrect to say, that because the matter was not pleaded
in the first suit, a second suit should be allowed. Only when the new
matter constitutes a different cause or thing demanded is a second
suit permitted. 3
Final Judgment
For res judicata to apply there must be a "thing adjudged" which
9. The Moreau-Lislet copy of the Digest of 1808 cites Pothier as the source of this
article. REPRINT OF THE DE LA VERGNE VOLUME: THE DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS, TERRI-
TORY OF ORLEANS IN 1808, WITH MOREAU-LISLET'S SOURCE NOTES, bk. III, tit. III, art. 252
(reprint of Moreau Lislet's personal copy of the 1808 Digest with handwritten interleaf
pages, reproductions of which may be found in the libraries of the Louisiana State
University and Tulane University Law Schools). Except for punctuation, the French
text of article 2265 of the Civil Code of 1825 corresponds exactly to article 1351 of Code
Napoleon. The English text of the Louisiana article has been unchanged since 1825
and is now article 2286. See 1972 COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA
art. 2286 (J. Dainow ed.).
10. See note 5 supra.
11. Generally a party who does not ask for all the relief to which he is entitled is
said to have divided his cause of action. For a discussion of how this relates to res
judicata see text at note 72 infra. In Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76, 75 So. 2d 14 (1954),
the supreme court held that when a party asked for a different form of relief in the
second suit there was a different "thing demanded" and thus res judicata did not
apply. For a critique of this case see text at note 61 infra.
12. In Succession of Reynolds, 231 La. 410, 91 So. 2d 584 (1956), several collateral
heirs had attacked the decedent's will on the grounds that the correct date of the will
was August 3, 1945 and not August 3, 1948 and that the will had been revoked. The
court concluded that the date of the will was the 1948 date. In the present suit the
heirs contended that the date of the will must be the 1945 date as it was physically
impossible that the 1948 date be correct. The court held the suit barred by res judicata
since only the reasons for invalidity urged in the second suit were different.
13. The Louisiana supreme court has stated that the common law rule that res
judicata includes not only what was actually pleaded but also that which might have
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Civil Code article 3556(31) defines as a final judgment." Compro-
mises,'5 judgments on the pleadings, summary judgments and dis-
missals with prejudice are considered final judgments.'" On the other
hand, a dismissal without prejudice,' 7 for failure to join proper par-
ties'" or for mootness, 9 is not a final judgment. Similarly, where the
dismissal results because the plaintiff failed to adequately allege a
valid cause of action, the dismissal is not considered final. However,
if the suit is dismissed because the plaintiff has no valid cause of
action, the dismissal will be considered a final judgment."
Identity of the Parties
Article 2286 requires that there be identity of the parties." A
been pleaded "does not obtain generally under our system." Woodcock v. Baldwin, 110
La. 270, 275, 34 So. 440, 441 (1902). In Simon v. Broussard, 216 So. 2d 668, 671 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1968), the court stated: "The general rule in Louisiana, unlike the com-
mon law rule, is that the application of res judicata is restricted to matters which were
actually litigated in the previous action, and it does not extend to causes of action
which might have been but were not alleged." However, this apparently misconstrues
the common law rule which applies only where the same cause of action is involved.
"[Ries judicata bars a second suit between the same parties and their privies on the
same cause of action as to all issues which were or could have been litigated in the
former suit .... " Harrison v. Bloomfield Bldg. Indus., Inc., 435 F.2d 1192, 1195 (6th
Cir. 1970). (Emphasis added.) See also 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS 1427 (5th ed. 1925).
Thus, the "might have been pleaded" rule adds nothing to res judicata at common
law which is not implicit in the requirements of same party and same cause of action.
Where these identities are present, res judicata precludes the suit even if certain
matters were not raised. The "might have been pleaded" rule is implicit in the Louis-
iana rule of res judicata in the same way. If the requisite identities of parties, cause
and object of demand are present the suit is conclusive even as to matters which
"might have been pleaded." It is at least potentially misleading to say that a matter
not pleaded will not be barred by res judicata.
14. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3556(31): "Thing adjudged is said of that which has been
decided by a final judgment, from which there can be no appeal, either because the
appeal did not lie, or because the time fixed by law for appealing is elapsed, or because
it has been confirmed on the appeal." See also LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 1841-42, 2167.
It should be noted that "res judicata" means "thing adjudged."
15. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3078: "Transactions have, between the interested parties,
a force equal to the authority of things adjudged .... "
16. "Judgments on the pleadings, and summary judgments, are final judgments
." LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 968. "A judgment of dismissal with prejudice shall have
the effect of a final judgment . LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1673.
17. Id. art. 1673.
18. Tucker v. New Orleans Laundries, 238 La. 207, 114 So. 2d 866 (1959).
19. Spinato v. Lowe, 240 La. 451, 123 So. 2d 884 (1960).
20. Johnson v. Sweat, 265 So. 2d 801 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Eugene v. Ventress,
209 So. 2d 341 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); Duke v. Gregory-Salisbury & Co., 205 So. 2d
858 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
21. "[T]he demand must be between the same parties, and formed by them
against each other in the same quality." LA. Civ. CODE art. 2286.
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judgment in a suit between A and B should have no effect in a later
suit between A and C even if each suit involves identical issues. A
lawsuit determines the legal relationship between the parties to the
suit and has no bearing on the relationship of those parties not pres-
ent. The requirement of identity of parties is not one of physical
identity but rather one of identity of capacity or quality. A person
who sues or is sued in a representative capacity, as a father for his
minor child or a tutor for his ward, would not be personally concluded
by the action though, of course, the person represented would be."
Additionally, the requirement of identity of the parties is met where
a successor or privy of one of the parties is involved. Thus, a judgment
determining one's property rights will be binding on a vendee, donee,
heir, or legatee who succeeds to his rights.2 3
One area which has troubled the courts with respect to identity
of the parties is that of vicarious liability. If a plaintiff brings an
unsuccessful suit against a defendant employee for damages caused
by the employee's negligence, is he thereafter precluded from suing
the employer? An affirmative answer was given by the Louisiana
supreme court in Muntz v. Algiers24 where the court sustained an
exception of res judicata by the employer without discussing the
22. Krone v. Krone, 138 La. 666, 70 So. 605 (1916); Ross v. Enaut, 46 La. Ann.
1250, 15 So. 803 (1894); Dalton v. Suhren, 128 So. 2d 456 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961);
Anderson v. Simmons, 75 So. 2d 34 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954).
23. Quinette v. Delhommer, 247 La. 1121, 176 So. 2d 399 (1965); Ruiz v. Succes-
sion of Viosca, 291 So. 2d 527 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Succession of Marlin, 240 So.
2d 387 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); Succession of Delesdernier, 184 So. 2d 37 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1966). See LA. CIv. CODE art. 3556(28): "Successor is, generally speaking, the
person who takes the place of another. There are in law two sorts of successors: the
successor by universal title . . . and the successor by particular title, such as the
buyer, donee or legatee of particular things, the transferee."
A privy has been defined as "representatives and successors including any person
having a legal right or interest in the subject matter of the prior suit derived through
succession or assignment from the litigant who asserted the right; or any person whose
legal right or interest in the subject matter in the prior suit was asserted by his legal
representative such as the husband as head and master of the community representing
the community interest of the wife, or the tutor asserting the interest of his minor
ward." Coates Equip. & Ser., Inc. v. Glover, 181 So. 2d 455, 459 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1965).
In Coates, the court held that Coates as an individual and Coates, Inc. were not
privies. But cf. Sample v. La. Oil Refining Corp., 162 La. 941, 111 So. 336 (1927) (where
the court held that since Nabors Oil Co. could not bring a second suit because of res
judicata neither could Sample bring one for the use and benefit of Nabors Oil.) See
also Barnett v. Develle, 289 So. 2d 129 (La. 1974); Calhoun v. La. Materials Co., 206
So. 2d 147 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
24. 116 La. 236, 40 So. 688 (1906). See also McKnight v. State, 68 So. 2d 652 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1953), noted in 14 LA. L. REv. 901 (1954).
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question of identity of the parties. In Williams v. Marionneaux,25 the
supreme court agreed with the decision in Muntz but criticized its
rationale on the ground that there was no identity of parties. The
Williams court reasoned that if an injured party compromises his
claim against an employee, there is no cause of action against the
employer.2"
A similar problem was presented in Bowman v. Liberty Mutual
Finance Co.27 Mrs. Bowman's demand against the employer for dam-
ages caused by its employee had been rejected in an earlier suit in
federal court. A second suit against the employee was barred by the
First Circuit though the court did not discuss the issue of identity of
the parties.
Thus, a suit against an employer or employee will preclude a
later one against the other although in neither case do the courts state
that there is identity of the parties. However, in an analogous situa-
tion, Pothier did consider there to be identity of the parties where the
primary obligor was sued first. In speaking of the surety-debtor rela-
tionship he indicated that:
[i]n consequence of the obligation of the surety being dependent
upon that of the principal debtor, the surety is also regarded as
the same party with the principal, in respect to whatever is de-
cided for or against him."8
If this analysis were applied to all situations where there is a second-
ary obligor, a suit against the primary obligor would be conclusive as
to the secondary obligor as res judicata would apply.
This would create no problem where the primary obligor was
found not to be liable.2 But if the primary obligor is found liable, it
is at least doubtful that this determination should be binding on the
secondary obligor who will not have had his day in court. To hold the
secondary obligor bound by the first determination might open the
door to collusive suits and would subject him to inadequate defense
25. 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960).
26. Had the court decided that suit is maintainable in this situation a problem
would exist should the employer be found liable. Under our law the employer could
sue the employee for indemnification. Yet the employee had been held not liable in
the first suit. If the employee were required to indemnify the employer then that
judgment in his favor would be meaningless. On the other hand if the employee were
protected the employer would lose his right of indemnification.
27. 149 So. 2d 723 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
28. 1 M. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 592 (Evans transl. 1853).
29. This was the situation in Williams, Muntz, and McKnight. See Note, 14 LA.
L. REV. 901 (1954), where the author takes the position that res judicata is inapplicable
in this situation.
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where the primary obligor has no real interest in defending the suit."
This problem could be dealt with by making the suit against the
primary obligor conclusive as to the secondary obligor only where
notice of suit is served on the secondary obligor and he is allowed to
intervene to protect his rights. This would enable the secondary obli-
gor to adequately defend himself but he could still be bound by a suit
in which he did not participate. A more feasible solution might be to
make a judgment against the primary obligor evidence in the second
suit which shifts the burden to the defendant to disprove liability. In
this way the first suit is accorded some weight but the secondary
obligor is not bound by an action to which he was not an actual
party.3 '
Louisiana courts have held that there is no identity of the parties
where co-defendants have previously litigated the issue of fault be-
tween themselves and later relitigate the issue as adverse parties. A
leading case is Harper v. Hunt.3 2 In a prior suit Foster sued both
Harper and Hunt and Harper was exonerated from liability. When
he sued Hunt, Harper claimed that the issue of his negligence was
res judicata. The First Circuit rejected the exception saying there was
no identity of parties.
The court's opinion is at least partially predicated on the fact
that there was a third party to the original suit. However, the crucial
question would appear to be whether the parties were able to litigate
fully the issues between themselves in the prior case. If not, they
would be appearing in a different "quality '3 3 and no identity should
be found. If they were able to litigate fully those issues at the first
trial there would appear to be no reason for finding the parties not
identical simply because of the presence of a third party in the first
suit.34
Identity of the Cause
Article 2286 also requires that "the demand must be founded on
the same cause of action . . . ." A correct translation of the French
30. For example, the primary obligor may be judgment proof and allow a default
judgment to be taken against him.
31. This solution could also be used in the Bowman situation where the secondary
obligor is sued first.
32. 247 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
33. "[T]he demand must be between the same parties; and formed by them
against each other in the same quality." LA. CIv. CODE art. 2286.
34. See also Stevens v. N.O. & N.E.R.R. Co., 341 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. La. 1972);
Buhler v. Villec, 117 So. 2d 286 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1960). In Buhler, the court held
that the identities of cause and object of demand were also not present.
19741
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text of the 1825 Code should be "the demand must be founded on the
same cause . . . ."3 Thus, our article refers to the civilian concept
of cause 3' and not to the common law cause of action. Both of these
concepts deal with the underlying basis of the suit and are similar.3 7
However, one subtle distinction is crucial to a proper understanding
of our res judicata law and can best be drawn by way of example.
When a lessor sues for rent and his demand is rejected, a second suit
for rent which becomes due at a different date will not be barred by
res judicata. 5 At common law it will not be barred because the cause
of action is not the same-a different month's rent is involved. For
the civilian, however, the cause is the same since both suits are based
on an alleged failure to fulfill the contractual requirement of paying
rent. The contract and its breach is the cause-the underlying
basis-of each suit. The fact that two different month's rent are
involved is taken into consideration under the concept of thing de-
manded rather than under the concept of cause . 3 From this it can
be seen that cause of action refers to the particular underlying basis
of a particular suit, while cause refers to the underlying basis of a suit
in a non-particular way.4"
Planiol has noted that there are no difficulties in determining
cause
when the claim has as its object a real right or a debt: the cause
is the principle giving rise to the right; in the case of a real right
35. (Emphasis added.) The French text reads: "la demande soit fonde6 sur la
meme cause .... LA. CIv. CODE art. 2265 (1825). See 1972 COMPILED EDITION OF THE
CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA art. 2286 (J. Dainow ed.)
36. Planiol defines cause as "the judicial or material fact which is the basis of the
right claimed or the defense pleaded." 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, no. 54 A(6),
at 38 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
The reader is cautioned not to confuse cause used herein with cause as used in
the context of obligations.
37. Some distinctions between the concepts are noted in Comment, 2 LA. L. REV.
347-65, 491-525 (1940).
38. The example is drawn from 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, no. 54 A(5)
(11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
39. "Causa actions or causa petandi in the Roman and Continental systems signi-
fies only the ground of action, as distinguished from the matter of parties and object
• ..whereas the 'cause of action' of Anglo-American law embraces within its concep-
tion all three of these elements namely, ground, parties, and object. Where we thus
speak of 'identity of the cause of action,' Continental terminology would require refer-
ence to the 'identity of demand' or 'identity of action,'" Millar, The Premises of the
Judgment as Res Judicata in the Continental and Anglo-American Law, 39 MicH. L.
REV. 1, 4 n.13 (1940).
40. Cause of action may be thought of as referring to the basis of this action; e.g.,
the particular breach which brought about this action. It does not encompass the basis
of the prior action which was a different breach and thus not the cause of this action.
[Vol. 34
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it is a purchase, donation, a legacy, etc.; in the case of the debt
it is a loan, a guaranty, a sale for which the price is due, damages
caused by a tort, etc.41
There is, however, difficulty in determining cause in suits involving
a demand for the nullity of a transaction. In Hope v. Madison" the
plaintiff had brought a prior unsuccessful suit contending that a sale
to her attorney was null for lack of consideration and fraud. The
present suit was brought to annul the sale on grounds that an attor-
ney may not purchase a litigious right under Civil Code article 2447.
The supreme court overruled an exception of res judicata holding that
the cause was not identical in the two cases. The court viewed the
cause of the first suit to be the lack of consideration and fraud rather
than the nullity of the sale. Although there is considerable doctrinal
authority for this narrow view of cause,43 it places the parties in an
unequal position. If the attorney-vendee in Hope had sued the vendor
to establish his right in the property, the cause of his suit would
clearly be the alleged sale. Furthermore, if the defendant-vendor had
successfully defended on the grounds of lack of consideration and
fraud (asserting a cause as a defense), the plaintiff-vendee could not
relitigate on the basis of the same sale since the cause would be
identical; i.e., the sale. But if the defendant-vendor was unsuccessful
in his defense, under the reasoning of Hope, he could bring a second
suit to annul the sale on different grounds since this would constitute
a new cause. Thus the vendor would again be allowed two attempts
at establishing the nullity of the sale while the vendee would have
only one chance to prove its validity.
This narrow view of cause prevents the doctrine or res judicata
from fulfilling its function. It encourages an unsuccessful party to
relitigate on an alternative basis, thereby prolonging the eventual
determination of the rights and obligations of the parties. This allows
the harassment of the successful party and increases the caseload of
the courts. Although in most cases a party will assert all of his causes
in order to avoid the time and expense of multiple litigation, this is
not always true."
While a broader view of cause has not been accepted,45 one court
41. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, no. 54 A(6) (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst.
transl. 1959).
42. 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666 (1940).
43. See Comment, 2 LA. L. REV. 347-65, 491-525 (1940).
44. One exception should be made to this broader view of cause where the second
suit for nullity is based on facts not existent or not knowable at the time of the first
suit.
45. See, e.g., Succession of Marioni, 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1935); Alexander
v. Alexander, 196 So. 2d 628 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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of appeal has expanded the narrow view advanced in Hope. The court
in Hope seems to equate cause with the particular theory offered by
the plaintiff for recovery. When a new theory was asserted in the
second suit a new cause was said to be asserted. In Black v. Meadow-
view Homes, Inc.," the Second Circuit held that an unsuccessful suit
in contract precluded a later one based on unjust enrichment. The
court reasoned that:
[n]either the object of the judgment, the demand nor cause of
action is determined by the theory of the pleadings but by the
allegations of fact. We hold that the petitioner pleaded sufficient
facts in his first petition, which would have allowed him to seek
and prove his entitlement to the relief he asks for in the instant
case.
7
Although cause is still equated with theory of recovery, it is the alle-
gations of fact which determine which theories may have been
raised .41
This approach appears to make sense. In Louisiana the court
may award "any relief to which the parties are entitled . . . ."I and
is not limited to the theory of a party's pleadings in rendering a
judgment. In a case like Black, the court may, without regard to the
fact that the theory was not pleaded, render a judgment based on
unjust enrichment. Thus it may be said that the court implicitly
adjudicated this unpleaded basis in the first suit. If the theory was
assertable from the facts pleaded but was not in fact asserted, and
the court failed to consider it, the party pleading the facts, rather
than the party who in no way raised the theory, should suffer the
harm.
A slightly different problem is presented by the recent case of
Bordelon v. Landry.5 Following an automobile wreck, Landry filed
suit against Bordelon and Bordelon filed against Landry in a different
court. 1 When a judgment for Landry was rendered in the suit he filed,
46. 201 So. 2d 218 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967).
47. Id. at 219. It should be noted that holding that the unsuccessful suit in con-
tract precluded a later one based on unjust enrichment is limited to the facts. Under
Black it is entirely possible that a suit in contract will not preclude a later one in unjust
enrichment given other circumstances.
48. See also Heine v. Muse, 206 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
49. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1841. Additionally, the Code of Civil Procedure provides
that an appellate court "shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper
upon the record on appeal." LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2164.
50. 278 So. 2d 173 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
51. Landry filed suit with his wife in Plaquemines Parish against Bordelon and
his liability insurer. Bordelon sued in Jefferson Parish for the wrongful death of his
wife and damages to his automobile against Landry, his liability insurer and the
manufacturer of Landry's car. 278 So. 2d at 174.
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he raised an exception of res judicata in Bordelon's suit against him.
The Fourth Circuit held that Bordelon's suit was not precluded by
the prior adjudication because the cause of action in the two suits was
different. According to the court, the cause of action asserted by
Landry was based upon the injuries he received while the cause of
action asserted by Bordelon was his own injuries. The court con-
cluded that since the causes of action were not identical, adjudication
in the first suit did not preclude litigation of the latter under article
2286.
While it is true that both Bordelon and Landry had causes based
upon their injuries, the fact of injury alone does not constitute a cause
under article 2286. There must be some legal basis for the suit which,
in a tort action, is the negligence or fault of the party who caused the
injury."2 The cause of Bordelon's suit was his assertion of injury due
to Landry's negligence. The same is true for Landry's suit against
Bordelon. Thus res judicata should apply in Bordelon's suit only if
the question of Landry's negligence was previously adjudicated. It
appears that a plea of contributory negligence was raised by Bordelon
in the suit against him by Landry. 53 A plea of contributory negligence
should be seen as the assertion of a cause as a defense since it puts
at issue the question of the plaintiff Landry's negligence. 54 In render-
ing a judgment for Landry, where a plea of contributory negligence
had been raised, the court must have determined that Bordelon
was negligent and that Landry was not.55 Thus, the issue of Landry's
negligence was adjudicated in the first trial and an exception of res
judicata should apply to preclude the second suit. The parties are the
same, the cause is the same since Bordelon is attempting to again
raise the question of Landry's negligence, and the thing demanded is
the same since the object of the second suit is to establish Landry's
negligence-the same object of Bordelon's plea of contributory negli-
gence in his first suit.
52. Planiol defines cause as "the juridical or material fact which is the basis of
the right or the defense pleaded." 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, no. 54 A(6) (11th
ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959). It is fault or negligence coupled with the fact of injury
which is the basis of the rights claimed by Bordelon and Landry.
53. "It is clear the issues presented to the courts in both cases were: (1) the
negligence of Landry; (2) the negligence of Mrs. Bordelon; and (3) the negligence of
Ford." Bordelon v. Landry, 278 So. 2d 173, 174 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
54. Planiol makes it clear that a cause may be asserted as a defense. See note 52
supra. See also LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 424: "A person who has a right to enforce an
obligation also has a right to use his cause of action as a defense."
55. In his dissent Judge Redmann stated: "In my view the Plaquemines action
necessarily decided, as between Landry and Bordelon, (1) Landry was not negligent
and (2) Bordelon was negligent. Therefore Landry should not have to litigate those
questions again and the dismissal of Landry and his insurer should be affirmed." 278
So. 2d at 177 (dissenting opinion).
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This analysis is more consistent with the basis of Louisiana res
judicata law-the presumption of correctness-than is the Bordelon
decision. Under the decision, every occurrence which results in multi-
ple injuries is subject to multiple suits with the possibility of incon-
sistent decisions. A could be found liable to B and B could be found
liable to A. The fact that the first court found B to be at fault would
be accorded no importance and certainly no irrebuttable presump-
tion of being correct.
51
Identity of the Thing Demanded
Identity of the thing demanded 57 refers to the particular contro-
versy which the court must adjudicate. 8 Its purpose is to insure that
res judicata does not preclude litigation of a suit simply because it is
based on the same cause urged in a prior suit between the same
parties. For a second suit to be barred it must have as its object the
same controversy and subject matter. Let us assume that A and B
disagree over whether they have entered a valid installment contract.
When the first installment becomes due A sues. In this case the object
of demand will be controlled by the defense asserted by B. If B suc-
cessfully defends on the ground that there is no valid contract be-
tween them, an exception of res judicata should be maintainable in
a latter suit on a different installment. By his defense, B has, in
56. The court also considered applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel or estop-
pel by judgment which precludes the relitigation of the same issues between the parties
even though the cause in the two suits is not identical. After a review of the jurispru-
dence, the court concluded that Louisiana did not recognize the doctrine.
It could be argued that the second suit in the Bordelon situation should be barred
even where no plea of contributory negligency was raised. In Spitzkeit v. Robinson,
289 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974), the court held that the defendant's failure to
plead an affirmative defense "does not now enable her to bring an action to annul the
judgment .... Id. at 847. See also Steele v. Ruiz, 202 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1967). Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense. If a party may not later raise
it in a suit to annul, it makes little sense to allow a suit in tort which might, in effect,
overrule the first decision.
57. "The thing demanded must be the same . LA. Civ. CODE art. 2286.
58. The requirement of identity of object "simply means that in both suits there
must be contemplated 'a recognition of the same right as to the same thing'; it 'signifies
in reality identity of the questions.'" Millar, The Premises of Judgment as Res Judi-
cata in Continental and Anglo-American Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (1940) quoting
from 3 GARSONNET & CEZER-BRU, TRAITi THI9ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE PROCODURE CIVILE
ET COMMERCIALE 420, 422 n.9 (3d ed. 1913). Planiol defines the requirement of identity
of thing demanded as being that the second suit "concerns the same object" as the
first. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAw TREATISE pt. 1, no. 54 A (3) (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl.
1959). While there is no enunciated requirement of identity of object in Anglo-
American law, it is implicit in the requirement of identity of the cause of action. See
note 39 supra.
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effect, made the whole of the debt the object of demand. Thus if A
later sues on a different installment the object of demand, as well
as the parties and cause will be the same.59 If B, however, successfully
defended the first suit on the ground that the installment had been
paid or was not yet due, the object of demand is limited to that
installment. Res judicata should not be maintainable in another suit
on a different installment. The object of such a suit is another install-
ment and the question of whether it is now due was not litigated in
the first action.10
Since the object of demand refers to the object or matter upon
which the parties demand an adjudication it should not be confused
with the form of relief for which a party asks. This was done in
Quarles v. Lewis.' The plaintiff in the original action had been
granted specific performance on a contract of sale. He later brought
a second suit for damages because of the defendant's failure to take
title and pay on the date agreed upon. The supreme court disallowed
the exception of res judicata on grounds that the thing demanded in
the two suits was not the same.
The fact that Quarles requested damages in the second suit does
not give that suit an object different from that of the first. The object
of Quarles' demand in both suits was an adjudication of his rights
stemming from the contract. Pothier makes clear that the kind of
relief requested does not affect the object of demand. He notes that
an unsuccessful action quanto minoris for the reduction in the price
of a horse which is alleged to have a fault has the same object of
demand as a later one for rescission of the sale on account of the same
fault. The object of demand in both suits involves the same
horse-the same controversy." Similarly, in Quarles, the object of
59. In the same context Baudry-Lacantinerie gives the following example: "In a
lawsuit, I have demanded from you a sum of 10,000 francs, constituting the amount
due of a claim of 20,000 francs, which I allege to have against you, and my demand
has been dismissed by a judgment which determines that I am not your creditor; I
would not be able to demand from you by a new action the balance of my alleged
claim." 3 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET BARDE, TRAITP TH9ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL-DEs OBLIGATIONS 960 (2d ed. 1905) (translation supplied).
60. Thus, there is no "identity of the questions." See note 58 supra.
61. 226 La. 76, 75 So. 2d 14 (1954).
62. "[Sluppose, for example, you proceed against me by the action quanto
minoris to obtain an abatement in the price of a horse, which you allege to have a
certain fault against which I have warranted him, it is decided that the horse has not
that fault, or that the warranty did not extent to it, and the demand is dismissed; if
you afterwards institute another action against me to rescind the sale, on account of
the same fault, I may oppose the exception reijudicatae, although the new demand is
made in a different form, and aims at a different conclusion, the three requisites
already mentioned occur, it is the same horse, eadem res, there is also eadem cause
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demand in both cases was the same breach-the same controversy
-and the exception of res judicata should have been sustained. 3
In Nicholson v. Holloway Planting Co., 4 a prior suit" had been
brought which recognized the existence of a servitude of drain from
the Nicholson property over the Holloway property but denied the
plaintiff Nicholson an injunction because no interference was shown.
A second suit was brought for an injunction and for damages. The
First Circuit"6 concluded that the second suit did not involve any new
controversy between the parties and sustained an exception of res
judicata. The supreme court reversed. However, the basis of the su-
preme court reversal was that the present suit involved matters which
occurred subsequent to the trial of the first suit and which could not
have been adjudicated at that time." Thus, as the supreme court saw
it, the second suit did not have the same object as the first because
an entirely different controversy had been placed before the court.
This is entirely proper. Unlike Quarles the court was called upon to
decide an entirely different matter which was in no way litigated in
the first suit."
petandi, for the question in both cases is, whether I have warranted against the fault
which you complain of, and the question is between the same parties, the difference
of the actions, and of the conditions, does not prevent their having the same object
and being eadem res ...." 1 M. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF OBLIGATIONS
587 (Evans transl. 1853).
See also Vico Concrete Co., Inc. v. Antley, 283 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973),
in which Antley had brought a previous redhibitory action to recover costs. In the
present suit by Vico for amount owed on open account Antley reconvened for a remis-
sion of the price due. "(We are of the opinion the main object or thing demanded in
both actions by Antley is identical." Id. at 832.
63. The situation in Quarles is distinguished from the installment contract exam-
ple in the text at note 60 supra. In that installment contract example the object of
demand in the first suit is the installment then sued on. In the second suit a different
installment and thus a different object is involved. In Quarles the object of demand
in the first suit was the contract and the failure to perform thereon. The litigation was
not limited to a particular installment or portion of the contract. In the second suit
the same contract and the same failure to perform were drawn into question. Thus the
object of demand was the same in both suits. The fact that Quarles failed to pray for
damages in the first suit did not entitle him to a second.
64. 284 So. 2d 898 (La. 1973).
65. 255 La. 1, 229 So. 2d 679 (1969).
66. 268 So. 2d 74 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
67. "Certainly [the plaintiff's] failure to prove interference or sufficient interfer-
ences on the facts as they were found to exist in 1966 does not bar his effort to prove
that an interference existed in 1970." Nicholson v. Holloway Planting Co., 284 So. 2d
898, 900 (La. 1973). "[Djamages incident to blockade occurring prior to the trial of
the first suit . . . are not being claimed in this litigation." Id. at 901.
68. The court in dicta questioned whether the object of demand could be the same
since the first suit was for an injunction and the second for an injunction and damages.
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The case of California Co. v. Price" is perhaps the best known
supreme court case on the authority of the decided case. The dispute
centered around ownership of royalty proceeds which were claimed
by the state and by the Price-Beckwith group. The supreme court
held the Price-Beckwith group to be owners of the proceeds on the
grounds that they were the owners of the leased land. The second suit
involved ownership of proceeds from seven other wells on the same
leased premises. The supreme court sustained pleas of res judicata
and judicial estoppel by the Price-Beckwith group. In considering the
plea of res judicata the court did not specifically show that the three
requisite identities were present apparently because the court did not
feel this was necessary in view of the sustained plea of judicial estop-
pel.
There was ample basis for deciding this case under Article 2286.
The parties and cause were identical in the two suits. And the court's
interpretation of the judgment in the first suit makes it clear that the
object of the demand of the two suits was the same. The court stated
that the object of the litigation in the first suit was an adjudication
of title to the land "because the validity of the title would have to be
determined in order for the court to decide who was entitled to the
funds."7 The second dispute involved exactly the same question
since the decision would again hinge on ownership of the leased land.
Hence, the thing demanded, that which the court was asked to adju-
dicate, was the same in both suits.7
Division of an Obligation
Article 425 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a party
"cannot divide an obligation due him for the purpose of bringing
The fact that "thing demanded" does not refer to the type of relief for which a party
asks is discussed in the text at note 61 supra. The court's decision that res judicata
did not apply was based on the fact that damages were not being claimed on account
of the incidents which brought on the first suit. See also Succession of Marlin, 240 So.
2d 387 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970) in which the court held that the object of demand was
the same in two suits involving the validity of an act of adoption.
69. 234 La. 338, 99 So. 2d 743 (1957).
70. California Co. v. Price, 234 La. 338, 349, 99 So. 2d 743, 746-47 (1957).
71. See also Olsen Engr. Corp. v. Hudson Engr. Corp., 289 So. 2d 346 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1974). This suit involved a pipeline explosion. In a prior suit in federal court
Hudson and U.S. Steel had been sued in a wrongful death action and each filed a
crossclaim against the other for indemnification and contribution. U.S. Steel was ulti-
mately found to be solely liable and its crossclaim against Hudson was dismissed. The
present suit involved a claim for property damage. Hudson and U.S. Steel were again
both named as defendants and U.S. Steel filed a third party demand against Hudson.
Hudson excepted to the third party demand on the ground of res judicata. The court
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separate actions on different portions thereof." The article further
provides that if an action is brought to enforce only a portion of the
obligation, the right to enforce the remaining portion is lost.72 In
Anglo-American law and in the Louisiana jurisprudence this doctrine
is known under the name of "splitting a cause of action." Under this
doctrine, it has been held, for example, that a party may not sue for
personal injuries and later bring suit for property damages." The
alleged fault creates only a single obligation which must be enforced
in a single suit.
At common law the doctrine of splitting a cause of action is a
corollary of res judicata. In every case where a cause of action is split
the parties are the same and, by definition, the cause of action is the
same. Thus the doctrine of splitting a cause of action is actually a
refinement of res judicata and applies only where res judicata would
itself apply.
The division of an obligation under Code of Civil Procedure arti-
cle 425 should be viewed in the same manner. When an obligation is
divided, the same parties, the same cause and the same object of
demand are urged in the two suits. For example, when a party sues
held that "the 'thing demanded' in the two claims [was] not the same" because "this
issue of Hudson's liability for indemnification and/or contribution to U.S. Steel for any
damages it might be condemned to pay for property damage sustained by the plaintiffs
. ..was not adjudicated in the [prior] case." Id. at 351. The fact that the prior case
was for personal injury and the present for property damages has no effect on the
question of whose fault caused the explosion. With regard to the crossclaim and third
party demand the parties involved were clearly the same. The cause was also the same
in that both the crossclaim and third party demand were based on the alleged fault of
Hudson. And the object of demand of both the crossclaim and third party demand was
the same controversy between the parties. The same explosion was involved in each.
It is clear that the adjudication of the third party demand was merely a re-adjudication
of what was determined in the crossclaim. The doctrine of res judicata is designed to
prevent exactly this kind of reconsideration of matters already judicially determined.
It should be noted that a suit to annul a judgment is not precluded by res judicata
because neither the cause nor the object of demand is identical with that of the suit
to be annulled. Even under the narrow view, the cause is the basis asserted for the
nullity. This could not have been asserted in the first suit. However, a suit to annul a
judgment for incorrectness will be barred by res judicata since the presumption of
correctness is irrebuttable under Civil Code article 2287. Maker v. Ivy, 291 So. 2d 861
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
72. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 425: "An obligee cannot divide an obligation due him
for the purpose of bringing separate actions on different portions thereof. If he brings
an action to enforce only a portion of the obligation, and does not amend his pleadings
to demand the enforcement of the full obligation, he shall lose his right to enforce the
remaining portion."
73. Thigpen v. Guarisco, 197 So. 2d 904 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Thompson v.
Kwett & Reel, 25 So. 2d 124 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946); Jackson v. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co., 199 So. 419 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940).
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for personal injuries and later attempts to sue for property damage,
the parties are identical, the underlying basis of the action-the al-
leged fault-is identical, and the object of demand is the same since
both suits involve the same basic controversy between the parties.
The fact that a different form of relief was requested should make no
difference with regard to the application of res judicata.74
The Louisiana jurisprudence has also held that a wrongful death
action and a survivor action constitute a single obligation and must
be brought together. 5 Strictly speaking res judicata would not apply
in this situation. In the survivor action the heirs sue on behalf of their
deceased ancestor while in the wrongful death action they sue in their
own behalf. Thus, there is no identity of parties. Likewise the object
of a wrongful death action is different from that of the survivor action
where there is a question of whether the death was caused by the
tortious conduct. This question would not be adjudicated in the sur-
vivor action.
However, requiring the wrongful death and survivor actions to be
brought in a single suit is consistent with the underlying objectives
of res judicata. The claim of the heirs for wrongful death is dependent
upon a finding of fault on the part of the defendant in the survivor
action. If the defendant is not liable to the deceased he clearly should
not be liable to the heirs for his wrongful death. Requiring the actions
to be ,brought together thus prevents possible inconsistency of deci-
sions and is in accord with the presumption of correctness which is
the foundation of our res judicata concept. It also promotes judicial
economy in that much of the same evidence is relevant and material
to both actions. Thus while the actions would not, strictly speaking,
be subject to an exception of res judicata under article 2286, the basic
purposes of the res judicata concept are furthered by requiring them
to be brought together.
The fact that the doctrine of res judicata and division of an
obligation are consistent should be an aid in the decision of cases like
Quarles v. Lewis."5 In Quarles the court specifically declined to decide
whether the second suit for damages would be precluded as the divi-
sion of a single obligation "because the sole issue for determination
• . .is whether the suit for specific performance is res ajudicata of
the present action for damages."77 Had the court been aware of the
interrelationship between the two doctrines it could not have decided
as it did."
74. See text at note 61 supra.
75. Norton v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., 178 La. 135, 150 So. 855 (1933).
76. 226 La. 76, 75 So. 2d 14 (1954), discussed in text at note 61 supra.
77. Id. at 87, 75 So. 2d at 18.
78. There are three jurisprudential exceptions to the rule that a suit is not conclu-
sive of a cause or object of demand not pleaded in the first suit. In petitory actions,
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Conclusion
In almost every Louisiana case involving res judicata language
can be found to the effect that res judicata is strictijuris and not to
be applied in cases of doubt.79 The fact that there are distinctions
between the requirements of article 2286 and those of Anglo-
American law has undoubtedly contributed to this attitude. The
courts have been quick to reject doctrines like the "might have been
pleaded" rule which have developed at common law. However, many
of the supposed distinctions have been made on the basis of an impro-
per understanding of article 2286. As has been pointed out, 0 the
"might have been pleaded" rule, correctly understood, is as implicit
under article 2286 as it is under the common law requirements of
identity cause of action and parties.
A more functional approach to res judicata is needed to deal with
the developments of modern law in other areas. For example, the
doctrine of vicarious liability has undergone significant development
since the adoption of the code." The courts have correspondingly
developed new preclusion concepts to deal with this development.2
The applicability of res judicata to other areas of development must
likewise be ascertained. This is not to say that every suit the least
bit connected with a prior one should be precluded. Article 2286 is
suits for partition of an immovable, and suits for an injunction against the execution
of a judgment, or of a writ of seizure and sale in executory process, "the parties to the
suit must assert whatever titles they have and not hold back any claim for future
litigation." Himel v. Connely, 195 La. 769, 777, 197 So. 424, 427 (1940). See also
Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76, 75 So. 2d 14 (1954); Comment, 2 LA. L. REv. 491 (1940).
Thus, in these instances, a judgment precludes not only relitigation of an identical
cause or demand but the litigation of a separate cause or demand as well. If A claims
title to land through B and C, he must litigate both bases of his ownership in the
petitory action. If he fails to set up his title through C, he may not thereafter assert
title on this basis even though it would constitute a separate cause. The basis for these
exceptions is in the need for stability of title. See Comment, 2 LA. L. Rv. 491, 521-23
(1940).
79. See, e.g., Olsen Engr. Corp. v. Hudson Engr. Corp., 289 So. 2d 346, 349 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1974): "[Res judicata] has been construed stricti juris"; Bordelon v.
Landry, 278 So. 2d 173, 175 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973): "The Louisiana concept of res
judicata . . . is restrictive"; Lege v. United States Fid. & Cas., 186 So. 2d 670, 672
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1966): "[Olur own doctrine is strictly construed."
80. Seeonote 13 supra.
81. In the master-servant relationship Civil Code article 2320 provides that mas-
ters will be liable for the damage occasioned by his servants only "when the masters
• . . might have prevented the act which caused the damage, and have not done it."
However, Louisiana cases hold the master liable even where he could not have pre-
vented the act. See Ragas v. Douglas, 139 La. 773, 72 So. 242 (1916); Nelson v. Crescent
City R.R. Co., 49 La. Ann. 491, 21 So. 635 (1897).
82. See text at notes 24-27 supra.
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designed to insure that only matters previously litigated are pre-
cluded. But in applying the article it must be remembered that res
judicata is designed to preclude that which has been adjudicated, and
when relitigation of matters already decided is allowed, a judgment
is meaningless.
Peter Wilbert Arbour
